Abstract. The behavior of complex networks under failure or attack depends strongly on the specific scenario. Of special interest are scale-free networks, which are usually seen as robust under random failure but appear to be especially vulnerable to targeted attacks. In recent studies of public transport networks of fourteen major cities of the world it was shown that these systems when represented by appropriate graphs may exhibit scale-free behavior [C. von Ferber et al., Physica A 380, 585 (2007), Eur. Phys. J. B 68, 261 (2009)]. Our present analysis, focuses on the effects that defunct or removed nodes have on the properties of public transport networks. Simulating different directed attack strategies, we derive vulnerability criteria that result in minimal strategies with high impact on these systems.
Introduction
The question of resilience or vulnerability of a complex network [1] against failure of its parts has, beside purely academic interest a whole range of important practical implications. In what follows below any such failure will be called an attack. In practice, the origin of the attack and its scenario may differ to large extent, ranging from random failure, when a node or a link in a network is removed at random to a targeted destruction, when the most influential network constituents are removed according to their operating characteristics. The notion of attack vulnerability of complex networks originates from studies of computer networks and was coined to denote the decrease of network performance as caused by the removal of either nodes or links. The behavior of a complex network under attack has been observed to drastically differ from that of regular lattices. Early evidence of this fact was found in particular for real world networks that show scale-free behavior: the world wide web and the internet [2, 3] , as well as metabolic [4] , food web [5] , and protein [6] networks. It appeared that these networks display a high degree of robustness against random failure. However, if the scenario a berche@lpm.u-nancy.fr b C.vonFerber@coventry.ac.uk c holtaras@lpm.u-nancy.fr d hol@icmp.lviv.ua is changed towards targeted attacks, the same networks may appear to be especially vulnerable [7, 8] .
Essential progress towards a theoretical description of the attack vulnerability of complex networks is due to the application of the tools and concepts of percolation phenomena [9] . On a lattice percolation occurs e.g. when at a given concentration of bonds a spanning cluster appears. This concentration c perc which is determined by an appropriate ensemble average in the thermodynamic limit is the so-called percolation threshold which is in general lattice dependent. On a general network the corresponding phenomenon is the emergence of a giant connected component (GCC) i.e. a connected subnetwork which in the limit of an infinite network contains a finite fraction of the network. For a random graph where given vertices are linked at random this threshold has been shown to be reached at one bond per vertex [10] . However the distribution p(k) of the degrees k of vertices in a random graph is Poissonian. A more general criterion applicable to networks with given degree distribution p(k) but otherwise random linking between vertices has been proposed by Molloy and Reed [11, 7, 8] . For such equilibrium networks a GCC can be shown to be present if
with the appropriate ensemble average . . . over networks with given degree distribution. Defining the Molloy-Reed parameter as the ratio of the moments of the degree dis-
the percolation threshold can then be determined by
Taken that for scale-free networks the degree distribution obeys power law scaling
one finds that the second moment k 2 diverges for γ < 3. Thus, the value γ = 3 separates two different regimes for the percolation on equilibrium scale free networks [7] . Indeed, for infinite equilibrium scale-free networks κ (k) (2) remains finite for γ > 3, however for γ < 3 a GCC is found to exist at any concentration of removed sites: the network appears to be extremely robust to random removal of nodes. Therefore, observed transitions for realworld systems [2, 3, 4, 5, 6 ] from the theoretical standpoint may be seen as finite-size effects or resulting from essential degree-degree correlations. The tolerance of scale-free networks to intentional attacks (when the highest degree nodes are removed) was studied in Ref. [12] . It was shown that even networks with γ < 3 may be sensitive to intentional attacks.
Obviously, the above theoretical results apply to ideal complex networks and for ensemble averages and may be confirmed within certain accuracy when applied to different individual real-world networks. Not only finite-size effects are the origin of this discrepancy [13] . Furthermore, even networks of similar type (e.g. of similar node degree distribution and size) may be characterized by a large variety of other characteristics. While some of them may have no impact on the percolation properties [14] , others do modify their behavior under attack, as empirically revealed in Ref. [15] for two different real-world scale-free networks (computer and collaboration networks). Therefore, an empirical analysis of the behavior of different realworld networks under attack appears timely and will allow not only to elaborate scenarios for possible defence mechanisms of operating networks but also to create strategies of network constructions, that are robust to attacks of various types.
In this paper, we present results of the analysis of the behavior of networks of public transport in large cities (public transport networks, PTNs) and consider attacks by various scenarios. To our knowledge the resilience of PTNs under attack has so far not been treated in terms of complex network concepts. Furthermore, in parallel we analyze a number of complex networks of the same type. Previous analysis usually focussed on a single instance of a network of given type [16] . Our study intends to show that even within a sample of several networks that were created for the same purpose, namely PTNs, one may observe essential diversity with respect to the behavior under attacks of various scenarios.
As we have mentioned above, the attack resilience of a network may be tested within a variety of different attack scenarios. In a given one, a list of nodes ordered by decreasing degree may be prepared for the unperturbed network and the attack successively removes vertices according to this original list [17, 18] . In a slightly different scenario the vertex degrees are recalculated and the list is reordered after each removal step [2] . In initial studies only little difference between these two scenarios was observed [8] , however further analysis showed [15, 19] that attacks according to recalculated lists often turn out to be more harmful than the attack strategies based on the initial list, suggesting that the network structure changes as important vertices or edges are removed. Other scenarios consider attacks following an order imposed by other measures of the centrality of a node, e.g. the so-called betweenness centrality [15] . In particular for the world-wide airport network, it has been shown recently [20, 21] that nodes with higher betweenness play a more important role in keeping the network connected than those with high degree. In our study, we will make use of the scenarios proposed so far as well as develop further algorithms to perform network attacks.
The paper is organized as follows, in the next Section we describe the database, define observables in terms of which we are going to follow the changes in the network properties under attacks, and describe the different attack strategies we will use. We display our principal results in sections 3, 4. There, we formulate criteria that allow to estimate the resilience of networks against attacks and discuss behavior of the PTNs during attacks following different strategies, outlining the most effective ones. Conclusions and an outlook are given in Section 5.
Databases, observables, and attack strategies
This study continues our analysis of the properties of PTNs initiated in Refs. [22, 23, 24] . As in these works, we rely on the publicly available information about PTNs of a set of fourteen major cities of the world [25] . Our choice for the selection of these cities was motivated by the idea to collect network samples from cities of different geographical, cultural, and economical background. In Table 1 we give some information summarizing the empirical analysis of some of the properties of the PTNs under consideration.
There are various ways to represent a PTN in terms of a graph [26] . These different representations allow for a comprehensive analysis of various PTN properties reflecting their operating functions. It is natural to perform the analysis of PTN attack resilience in terms of these representations. These are briefly summarized in Fig. 1 . For the purpose of the present analysis, we will make use of the so-called L and P-space graphs. In L-space representation [26] the PTN is represented by a graph with nodes that correspond to the stations, whereas links correspond to connections between stations within one stop distance (Fig. 1b) . In the P-space [27] all station-nodes that belong to the same route form of a complete subgraph of the network (Fig. 1c) .
Let us take the L-space representation to introduce the observables we will use to quantify the PTN behavior a.
b. c. The following characteristics are given in Land P-spaces, as indicated by the subscripts: k (mean node degree); ℓ max , ℓ (maximal and mean shortest path length); c (relation of the mean clustering coefficient to that of the classical random graph of equal size); κ (z) , κ (k) (c.f. Eqs. (2), (14)); γ (an exponent in the power law (4) fit, bracketed values indicate less reliable fits, see text). More data is given in [23] .
under attack. Keep in mind however, that in our analysis presented in Section 3 we will deal also with the P-space. There are two intrinsically connected questions that naturally arise when one wants to describe quantitatively how a certain network changes when its nodes are removed [28] . The first is how to choose the 'order-parameter' variable that signals the quantitative change in the network behavior (i.e. the break down of the network), the second is how to locate the value of concentration of removed nodes at which this change occurs. As we have mentioned in the introduction, in a theoretical description a useful quantity is the GCC: its disappearance can be associated with a network breakdown. Strictly speaking, the GCC is welldefined only in the N → ∞ limit, therefore in practice dealing with a network of a finite size N it is substituted by the size of the largest connected component. We will use in the following its normalized value defined by:
with N and N 1 being number of nodes of the network and of its largest component correspondingly. By definition (5), a largest component is always present in a network of non-zero size. A useful quantity to measure network connectivity is the average shortest path:
where ℓ(i, j) is the length of a shortest path from node i to j and the sum spans all pairs i, j of sites of the network. However, ℓ is ill-defined for a disconnected network. Alternatively, one can suitably define the mean inverse shortest path length [15] by:
with ℓ −1 (i, j) = 0 if nodes i, j are disconnected. As one can see, Eq. (7) is well-defined even for a disconnected network and as such can be used to trace changes of network behavior under attack. To give an example, we show in Fig. 2 how the largest component fraction S, Eq. (5) and the mean inverse shortest path length ℓ −1 , Eq. (7), change upon random removal of nodes in each of fourteen PTNs selected for our study. More precisely, we measure these quantities as functions of the fraction of removed nodes c starting from the unperturbed network (c = 0) and eliminating at random step-by-step 1 % of the nodes up to c = 1. In what follows below we will call this scenario a random scenario. Already this first attack attempt brings about interesting (and in part unexpected) PTN features. Namely: (i) different PTNs react on random removal of their nodes in different ways, that range from rapid abrupt breakdown (Dallas) to a slow almost linear decrease (Paris); (ii) although qualitatively similar, the observed impact of the attack differs depending on which variable is used as indicator, either S or ℓ −1 . Ordering the PTNs by their vulnerability, this order may thus differ depending on the applied indicator; (iii) up to c = 1, there is no general 'percolation threshold' concentration of removed nodes c at which S (or ℓ −1 ) vanishes that would hold for all PTNs. Rather for some individual PTNs one observes various values of c at which these PTNs show abrupt changes of their properties.
Figs. 2 a,b display how the different PTNs react on a random removal of their nodes. Obviously, the question immediately arises how this behavior changes if one removes the nodes not at random, but following a given order or scheme (we call this the scenario of the attack). As we have mentioned in the introduction, a number of different attack scenarios have been proposed [2, 8, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 24] . These are generally based on the intuitive assumption that the largest impact on a network is caused by the removal of its most 'important' nodes. A number of indicators have been developed in particular in applications of graph theory for social science to measure the importance of a node. Besides the node degree k j , which is equivalent to the number of nearest neighbors z 1 (j) of a given node j, different centralities have been introduced for this purpose. In particular, the closeness C C (j), graph C G (j), stress C S (j), and betweenness centralities C B (j) of a node j are defined as follows (see e.g. [29] ):
In Eqs. (8)- (10), ℓ(j, t) is the length of a shortest path between the nodes j, t that belong to the network N , σ st is the number of shortest paths between the two nodes s, t ∈ N , and σ st (j) is the number of shortest paths between nodes s and t that go through the node j. Alternatively, one may measure the importance of a given node j by the number of its second nearest neighbors z 2 (j) or its clustering coefficient C(j). The latter is the ratio of the number of links E j between the k j nearest neighbors of j and the maximal possible number of mutual links between them:
Removing important nodes according to lists prepared in the order of decreasing node degrees k, centralities (8)- (11), number of their second nearest neighbors z 2 , and increasing clustering coefficient C defines seven different attack scenarios. As we have already mentioned in the introduction, the scenarios can be either implemented according to lists prepared for the initial PTN before the attacks (we will indicate the corresponding scenario by a superscript i, e.g. C i B ) or by lists rebuilt by recalculating the order of the remaining nodes after each step. Together, this leads to fourteen different attack scenarios. In addition, we will keep the above described random scenario (denoted further as RV) and add one scenario more, removing a randomly chosen neighbor of a randomly chosen node (RN). The latter scenario appears to be effective for immunization problems [30] and it is based on the fact, that in this way nodes with a high number of neighbors will be selected with higher probability. Note that in this scenario only a neighbor node is removed and not the initially chosen one. All together, this defines sixteen different scenarios to attack a network and we apply these to all fourteen PTNs that form our database. A typical result for a single PTN is displayed in Fig. 3 . Here, we show how the largest connected component size S of the Paris PTN changes under the influence of the above described attack scenarios. Already from this plot one may discriminate between the most effective scenarios that result in a fast decrease of the largest component size (those governed by betweenness and stress centralities, node degree, and next nearest neighbors number -see the Figure) and the less harmful ones. In the following, instead of displaying the results of all attacks for all different PTNs we will focus on the results of the most effective scenarios comparing them with those of random failure as introduced by the random scenario. As outlined in the introduction, we make use of different PTN representations (different 'spaces' of Fig. 1 ). In the following section, we present the analysis of PTN resilience in the L-space representation.
Results in L-space
The L-space representation of a PTN is a graph that represents each station by a node, a link between nodes indicates that there is at least one route that services the two corresponding stations consecutively. No multiple links are allowed (see Fig. 1b) . Therefore, attacks in the L-space correspond to situations, in which given public transport stations cease to operate for all means of traffic that go through them. Note however, that in this representation, the removal of a station node does not otherwise interfere with the operation of a route that includes this station. It rather splits this route into two (operating) pieces. An alternative situation will be considered in the forthcoming section.
In order to answer some of the questions raised in Section 2, let us return to Fig. 3 , where the impact on the largest component size S of the PTN of Paris is shown for sixteen different attack scenarios as function of the fraction of removed nodes. As we have already remarked, for this PTN the most influential are the scenarios where nodes are removed according to lists ordered by
S (we list the characteristics in a decreasing order of effectiveness of the corresponding scenario). For a small value of c (c < 0.07) these scenarios cause practically indistinguishable impact on S with a linear behavior S ∼ (1 − c). As c increases, deviations from the linear behavior arise and the impact of different scenarios start to vary. In particular, there appear differences between the role played by the nodes with highest value of k and highest betweenness centrality C B . Whereas the first quantity is a local one, i.e. it is calculated from properties of the immediate environment of each node, the second one is global. Moreover, the k-based strategy aims to remove a maximal number of edges whereas the C B -based strategy aims to cut as many shortest paths as possible. In addition, there arise differences between the 'initial' and 'recalculated' scenarios, suggesting that the network structure changes as important nodes are removed. Similar behavior of S(c) is observed for all PTNs included in this study, with certain peculiarities in the order of effectiveness of different attack scenarios. Note however, that the difference between 'initial' and 'recalculated' scenarios is less evident for strategies based on local characteristics, as e.g. the node degree or the number of second nearest neighbors (c.f. curves for k, k i and z 2 , z i 2 , respectively). This difference between initial and recalculated characteristics is even more pronounced for the centrality-based scenarios. Now let us return to some of the observations of Section 2. Namely, we noted that the observed impact of an attack may differ depending on which observable is used as the 'order-parameter' variable (c.f. Fig. 2 where this is shown for the RV attack scenario taking either S or ℓ −1 as 'order-parameter'). Similar differences we observe also in the case of the other scenarios. For the sake of uniqueness in the following we will use the value of S to measure the effectiveness of a given attack. This choice is motivated by several reasons: (i) in an infinite network limit S defines an order parameter of the classical percolation problem [9] ; (ii) differences between network resilience as judged e.g. by the behavior of S or by that of ℓ −1 are not significant enough to be a subject of special analysis (at least not for the PTNs we consider); (iii) considering S naturally leads to other useful characteristics that allow to estimate the PTN operating ability and its segmentation. Let us stop to elaborate the latter point in more detail.
As we have already emphasized, there is no well defined 'percolation threshold' concentration of removed nodes c perc at which S (or ℓ −1 ) vanishes (see Figs. 2, 3 ) which could serve as evidence of a break down of the largest PTN component and hence of the loss of operating ability [31] . In Ref. [24] it has been proposed to use the behavior of maximal shortest path length ℓ max as a possible indicator of the network break down. This was based on the observation, that as the concentration of removed nodes c increases, the value of ℓ max for different PTNs displays similar typical behavior: initial growth and then an abrupt decrease when a certain threshold is reached (see e.g. Fig.  4 a where this value is shown for the recalculated highest degree attack scenario of the PTNs of Paris and London). Obviously, removing the nodes initially increases the path lengths as deviations from the original shortest paths need to be taken into account. Further removing nodes then at some point leads to the breakup of the network into smaller components on which the paths are naturally limited by the size of these components which explains the sudden decrease of their lengths. For comparison, in Fig.  4 b we show how the value of S changes under the recalculated highest degree scenario for the above PTNs.
Being certainly useful for many instances of the PTNs analyzed, the above ℓ max -based criterion cannot serve as an universal tool to determine the region of c, where the network stops to operate. One of the reasons is that for certain PTNs (as well as for certain attack scenarios) we have found that ℓ max does not show a pronounced maximum, but rather shows several maxima at different values of c. Therefore, to devise a criterion which may be equally well used for any of the networks we decided to define characteristic concentration of removed nodes c s at which the size of the largest component S decreases to one half of its initial value. This characteristic concentration al- 
In Fig. 5 we plot the size of the largest connected component S for different PTNs as function of the fraction of removed nodes c for the random vertex scenario (RV) in L-space. The choice of the lowest S value S = 1/2 in this figure enables one to find the value c s as the crossing point of S(c) with the horizontal axis. The values of c s obtained for this scenario are given in the last column of decrease without any abrupt changes in S (like PTNs of Paris, Moscow, Sydney) while others are characterized by rather fast decay of S (Dallas, Los Angeles, Istanbul). Now, applying these attacks according to the sixteen scenarios described above we are in the position to discriminate them by their degree of destruction and to single out those with the highest impact on each of the PTNs considered. To this end, for each PTN we give in Table 2 the segmentation concentration c s for the five most harmful attack scenarios. The obtained values of c s are given in increasing order. Near each value we denote the scenario that was implemented. Our analysis reveals the most harmful scenarios as those targeted at nodes with the highest values of either the node degree k, the betweenness centrality C B , the next nearest neighbor number z 2 , or the stress centrality C S recalculated after each step of the attack.
It is instructive to observe correlations between the characteristics of unperturbed PTNs (see Table 1 ) and their robustness to attacks. Such correlations may allow for an a priory estimate of the resilience of a network with respect to attacks. As discussed in the introduction, percolation theory for uncorrelated networks predicts that the value of the Molloy-Reed parameter κ (k) , Eq. (2), can be used to measure the distance to the percolation point κ (k) = 2. We may therefore expect that networks with a higher value of κ (k) show higher resilience. To this end let us first compare the values of c s for certain scenarios with the value of κ (k) for the unperturbed PTN. Before doing this let us note that for an uncorrelated network the value of κ (k) can be equally represented by the ratio between the mean next neighbors number of a node z 1 (which is by definition equal to the mean node degree k ) and the mean second nearest neighbors number z 2 :
Indeed, given that for such a network (see e.g. [1] )
one can rewrite (3) as:
The relation κ (k) = κ (z) + 1 holds only approximately for the real-world networks we consider in our study, as one can see, e.g., from the Table 1 . In Fig. 6a we compare both quantities κ (k) , κ (z) for unperturbed PTNs with the corresponding segmentation concentration c s for the random attack scenario. Within the expected scatter of data one can definitely observe a general tendency of c s to increase with both κ (k) and κ (z) : the higher the value of κ for an unperturbed network, the more robust it is to random removal of its vertices. This conclusion, however with a more pronounced scatter of data even holds if one repeats the same analysis for the case of the scenario based on recalculated node degrees, as shown in Fig. 6b . Again, one observes c s to increase with increasing κ. For the betweenness-based attack scenarios the data is even more scattered and a prediction based on the a priori calculated ratios is unreliable.
Another useful observation concerns the correlation between the PTN attack resilience and the node-degree distribution exponent γ (4). As we have observed in the previous studies [22, 23] some of the PTNs under consideration are scale-free: their node-degree distributions have been fitted to a power-law decay (4) with the exponents shown in Table 1 . Others are characterized rather by an exponential decay, but up to a certain accuracy they can also be approximated by a power-law behavior (then, the corresponding exponent is shown in Table 1 in brackets). In Fig. 7a we show the correlation between the fitted nodedegree distribution exponent γ and c s for the random attack scenario. Filled circles correspond to scale-free PTNs, open circles correspond to the PTNs where the scale-free behavior is less pronounced. It is interesting to observe, that even if we include the PTNs which are better described by the exponential decay of the node-degree distributions, there is a notable tendency to find PTNs with (3), (14) and segmentation concentration cs. Open circles: smaller values of γ to be more resilient as indicated by larger values of c s . This tendency is again confirmed if one considers the recalculated node degree attack scenario, as shown in Fig. 7b . The above observed correlation between the exponent γ that characterizes the unperturbed network (i.e. a PTN at c = 0) and the segmentation concentration c s at which however the PTN is to a large part unperturbed indicates that some global properties of the node-degree distribution may remain essentially unchanged when the nodes are removed (i.e. a scale-free distribution remains scalefree as c increases, 0 < c < c s ). To check that assumption for the RV scenario, we analyzed the averaged cumulative node degree distributions for each of the PTNs with 3,5, and 10 % of removed nodes. The cumulative distribution P (k) is defined in terms of the node-degree distribution p(q) (4) as:
with k max the maximal node degree in the given PTN. Typical results of this analysis are shown in Fig. 8 , for the PTN of Paris. We compare the cumulative node degree distribution P (k) of the unperturbed PTN with that of the PTN where a given fraction c part of the nodes (c = 0.03, 0.05, and 0.1, correspondingly) was removed according to the random attack scenario (RV). For each of the concentrations of the removed nodes, P (k) was averaged over 2000 repeated attacks. In the first plot, Fig. 8a , we compare the three resulting average distributions (for c = 0.03, 0.05, and 0.1) with the original one (c = 0). One clearly sees that there is no qualitative or even quantitative (change of exponent) change of the distributions for any of the three cases. Indeed, if one has a large set of nodes with a given nodedegree distribution any sufficiently large random subset of these nodes should have the same distribution; in particular this holds if one averages these subset distributions over many instances. The above argument seems to ignore the change of degrees in the subset due to cutting off those vertices not remaining in the set. However, due to the random choice of the removed nodes the share of lost degree will on the average be proportional to the degree of each vertex: the higher its degree the more probable it is that one of its neighbors is chosen to be removed and this probability is proportional to its degree. Thus, the sum of degrees in the remaining subset is lower; but the degree distribution P (k) is effectively transformed to P ′ (ck) = nP (k) where c is the probability of any node being removed and P ′ (k) is the distribution in the remaining subset of nodes, n a normalization. For an exponential distribution this transformation shifts the scale. However, a scale free distribution keeps its exponent under such a transformation.
In the other three plots, Figs. 8b-d we show for each amount of removed nodes the average cumulative distribution together with statistical errors calculated as the standard deviation within the ensemble of the 2000 instances generated in the sample. Even on the logarithmic scale these are very small for all but the very high degrees where fluctuations of small numbers of often less than one node for a given degree occur.
Results in P-space
Let us complement the L-space analysis performed above by observing the reaction of PTN graphs under attack when one observes them in another representation. In particular, we will investigate P-space graphs. First let us recall that in this representation each node corresponds to a PTN station, i.e. it has the same interpretation as in the L-space. However, the interpretation of a link differs from that in the L-space: now all station-nodes that belong to the same route are connected and thus each route enters the P-space network as a complete subgraph. This results in the main peculiarity of the interpretation of the behavior under attacks of these graphs. Consider as an example the P-space graph of Fig. 1c and compare it to the original PTN map, Fig. 1a . Whereas the removal of station node C in the map (Fig. 1a) disconnects the nodes B and D, the removal of the same node in the P-space (Fig.  1c) keeps nodes B and D connected, as far as they still belong to the same route. Therefore, the removal of nodes in P-space, performed either in a random way or according to certain lists, has a different interpretation in comparison to that occurring in the L-space. An interpretation of the removal of nodes in P-space is the following: if a node is removed, the corresponding stop of the route is canceled while the route otherwise keeps operating. If in the above example the station-node C is removed, route No 2 still keeps operating and station-node B can be reached from D, only without stopping at C (e.g. the bus takes a shortcut). In this way, as we will see below, the removal of nodes in P-space allows us to gain additional insight into the PTN structure.
As in the case of the L-space representation, we study the resilience of the P-space PTN graphs to attacks performed following the sixteen different scenarios defined in Section 3. In Fig. 9 we show the change of the size of the largest cluster S (a) and the average inverse mean shortest path length ℓ −1 (b) under random attacks (RV). If one compares this behavior with that observed for the RV scenario in L-space (see Fig. 2 ) one sees, that all PTNs under consideration react in a much more homogeneous way. In L-space random attacks lead to changes of the largest connected component S that range from an abrupt breakdown (Dallas) to a slow smooth decrease (Paris). In P-space one observes for the same scenario only a decrease of S which corresponds to the number of removed nodes.
No break-down of this cluster occurs in this scenario. The value of S(c s ) defined by the condition (13) is given in the last column of Table 3 . It is worth to note, that the behavior of the mean inverse shortest path length ℓ −1 as function of the fraction c of disabled nodes is also qualitatively different between the two RV scenarios in L- (Fig.  2b ) and P- (Fig. 9b) spaces. In L-space ℓ −1 decreases in general faster than linearly indicating an increase of the path length between the nodes as well as partitioning of the network. In P-space ℓ −1 remains for a large part unperturbed as the nodes of the complete subgraph remain essentially connected and the shortest path lengths remain almost unchanged until only a small fraction of the network remains.
To further detail the situation, similar as in Section 3, we summarize in Table 3 the outcome of the five most harmful attack scenarios and compare those with the random attack scenario. As it follows from the Table and as is further supported by Fig. 10 , the betweenness-targeted scenarios appear to be the most harmful. Following this observation let us investigate the role of the highest betweenness nodes: above all these are the nodes (and not the highest-k hubs) that control the PTN behavior under attack. The P-space degrees of these high-betweenness nodes do not essentially differ from those of the hubs, therefore they cannot be easily distinguished from the other nodes during attacks according to highest-k scenario. To support this assumption, let us recall that in the P-space representation each route enters the overall network as a complete subgraph, with all nodes interconnected. Removing nodes from a complete graph does not lead to any segmentation. The decrease of the normalized size of this graph will be given by the exact formula S = 1 − c (which is -almost -reproduced by the RV scenario, c.f. Fig. 9a ). Under such circumstances a special role is played by those nodes that join different complete graphs (different routes). The removal of such nodes will separate different complete routes and as a result may lead to network segmentation. Naturally, being between different complete subgraphs such nodes are characterized by high centrality indices, as observed above. Moreover, as far as their direct neighbors belong to different complete graphs, these neighbors are not connected between each other resulting in a lower value of the clustering coefficient C. From Table 3 one sees that attacks based on choosing nodes with low-C values are very effective in P-space.
To conclude this section, we ask the question if a simple criterion can be found that allows to predict a priori the P-space PTN vulnerability. Namely, given the general PTN characteristics (see Table 1 ) can one forecast resilience against attacks in P-space? The answer is given by the observation that the networks with low mean shortest path length ℓ P are the best connected in P-space and hence may be expected to be less vulnerable. Indeed, on the one hand, for the above example of a complete graph (a single PTN route) ℓ P = 1 and it is extremely robust to P-space attacks. On the other hand, a high value of ℓ P indicates numerous intermediate nodes between different routes. As we have checked above, the targeted removal of such nodes leads to rapid network segmentation. In support of the above reasoning, in Fig. 11 we plot c s as function of ℓ P for attacks based on the highest betweenness centrality scenario. There, within the expected scatter of data one observes a clear evidence of the decrease of c s with ℓ P , i.e. networks with higher mean path length break down at smaller values of c and are thus more vulnerable.
It is worth to note here, that in P-space it is only the RV attack that has very similar impact on all PTNs (see Fig. 9 ). As we have just observed, similar to the Lspace also in P-space the PTNs manifest different level of robustness against attacks targeted on the most important nodes. However, the order of vulnerability changes if one compares the outcome of the L-space and P-space attacks. This means that PTNs that were vulnerable in the Lspace may appear to be robust against attacks in P-space. From Table 3 we see that the PTNs that are most stable against highest C B -targeted attacks in P-space are the Table 2 . This is however not the case for the PTNs of Hong Kong and Saõ Paolo. In L-space, these belong to the most vulnerable PTNs.
Conclusions and outlook
In this paper, we have studied the behavior of city public transportation networks (PTNs) under attacks. In our analysis we have examined PTNs of fourteen major cities of the world. The principal motivation behind this study was to observe the behavior under attack of a sample of networks that were constructed for the same purpose, to compare these with available analytical results for percolation of complex networks, and possibly to derive some conclusions about correlations between PTN characteristics calculated a priory and the resilience to attacks. Furthermore, the resilience behavior of a network against different attack scenarios gives additional insight into the network architecture, discovering structures on different scales. This approach has been termed the 'tomography' of a network [14] . In our study we have also attempted to compare our results with the predictions of percolation theory on networks. Due to the sizes of these systems which are far from the thermodynamic limit and the rather small sample of networks no quantitative comparison appeared possible. However, qualitative predictions about the location of segmentation thresholds and thus the vulnerability could be verified. Although our study was not primarily motivated by applications, some of the results and methods developed within this study may be useful for planning and risk assessment of PTNs. Our analysis has identified PTN structures which are especially vulnerable and others, which are particulary resilient against attacks. Further investigation of other relevant network properties may reveal mechanisms behind this structural resilience [32] . Furthermore we note that the methods developed here also allow to identify minimal strategies to obstruct the operation of the PTN of a city e.g. for the purposes of industrial action and possibly achieve a successful end of a social conflict.
To analyze PTN resilience we have applied different attack scenarios, that range from a random failure to a targeted destruction, when the most influential network nodes were removed according to their operating characteristics. To choose the most influential nodes, we have used different graph theoretical indicators and determined in such a way the most effective attack scenarios. By our paper we show that even within a sample of networks that were created for the same purpose one observes essential diversity with respect to their behavior under attacks of various scenarios. Results of our analysis show that PTNs demonstrate rich variety of behavior under attacks, that range from smooth decay to abrupt change.
As shown by our study, the impact of attacks may be measured by different quantities. As a criterion that is well defined and easily reproducible we choose to define the segmentation concentration c s to correspond to the situation where the largest remaining cluster contains one half of the original nodes of the network. Let us note as well, that definitely not all of the PTNs analyzed demonstrated scale-free behavior in P-space (and even less in L-space). Nevertheless, in spite of the diversity of behavior we clearly see common tendencies in their reaction to attacks. In particular, this enabled us to propose criteria that allow an a priori estimate of PTN robustness. In Lspace resilience is indicated by a high value of the MolloyReed parameter κ, Eqs. (2), (14) or by a small value of the exponent γ, if a power law is observed for the PTN node degree distribution, in P-space high resilience is indicated by a small mean shortest path length ℓ P .
One of possible continuations of our study will be the analysis of PTN resilience in other graph representations, than those that were described above.
